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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Notice of Appeal in the instant case was filed with the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j), which grants to the Utah Supreme
Court original appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. The
Utah Supreme Court then transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(4), thereby investing the Utah Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue One: Whether the district court correctly determined that Luke L. Adams'
("Adams") January 22, 1999 transfer of certain real property in Layton City, Davis
County, Utah (the "Property") was a triggering event under the terms of the relevant
promissory note and deed of trust.
Standard of Review: A court's interpretation of a contract is reviewed for
correctness. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5 | 7, 201 P.3d 1004; Chen
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1f 25, 100 P.3d 1177.
Issue Two: Whether the district court correctly applied the six-year statute of
limitations contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-309 to bar the claims asserted against
Adams by Carmen Adams Finan ("Finan").
Standard of Review: A court's application of a statute of limitations is reviewed
for correctness, albeit with some measure of deference to the trial court's assessment.
Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, U 23, 989 P.2d 61.

Issue Three: Whether the district court correctly held that Utah's equitable
discovery rule was inapplicable to Finan's claims.
Standard of Review. A court's application of the equitable discovery rule is
reviewed for correctness. Estate of Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 343, f 6, 265 P.3d 813.
Issue Four: Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Finan's
Rule 60(b) Motion.
Standard of Review: A court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT
App 110,19, 2 P.3d 451.
Issue Five: Whether the district court erred in denying Finan's motion for
summary judgment and her claim for damages in the amount of $ 126,418.30.
Standard of Review: A court's denial of a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600.
Issue Six: Whether Utah's Recording Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-309, is
Constitutional.
Standard of Review: A district court's interpretation of the Utah Constitution is
reviewed for correctness. Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2011
UT 43, U 9, 259 P.3d 1055. However, this issue was not preserved for appeal. 438 Main
St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, | 51, 99 P.3d 801.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
•

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) provides that:
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
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prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a
document complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged,
each copy of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each
financing statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county
recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
•

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2) provides that:
An action may be brought within six years:
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78B-2-308;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case:
This matter began as a younger brother agreed to execute a trust deed and
promissory note insisted upon by his older sister to equalize a claimed unequal
inheritance that would later impact the interests of the Property. (R. 196-198). In May
1991, at the request of Finan, one of Adam's two sisters, Adams executed a Trust Deed
Note (the "Note") and Trust Deed in favor of his two sisters, whereby Adams agreed to
pay them the sum of $26,340.00 (approximately 20% of the value of the Property).1 (R.
196-195). The triggering event for immediate payment of the amounts owed under the
Note was to occur "[i]n the event the title to the [Property] . . . [was] sold, assigned or
transferred for any reason or in any manner." (R. 202).
On January 22, 1999, by way of a quit claim deed, Adams transferred the Property
to himself and his wife, Diana C. Adams, as joint tenants and recorded the deed with the

The Note required Adams to pay $13,170.00 to each of his two sisters.

i

Davis County Recorder. (R. 115). Adams never paid any amount to Finan under the
Note or the Trust Deed. On or about September 11, 2007, Finan filed suit to enforce
whatever rights she may have had pursuant to the Note and Trust Deed. (R. 1).
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition by the District Court:
On or about September 11, 2007, Finan filed her Complaint asserting causes of
action for breach of contract and foreclosure. (R. 1). On or about September 16, 2009,
Finan died. (R. 57). On March 30, 2010, Finan's daughters, Christine Helfrich and Mary
Anne Chesarek, who also serve as successors and representatives of Finan's estate and
the trustees of Finan's revocable trust, substituted as party plaintiffs and filed an amended
complaint reflecting the substitution on May 3, 2010.2 (R. 53 and 65).
On or about July 30, 2010, Finan filed her Motion for Summary Judgment
asserting that Adams transferred the Property and that payment under the Note and the
Trust Deed was due and owing. (R. 88). On or about August 16, 2010, Adams filed his
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment arguing, among other things, that Finan's claims
were barred by the six-year statute of limitations contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2309(2). (R.174).
On or about December 13, 2010, the district court held a hearing regarding the
motions for summary judgment. (R. 388 and 389). The district court issued its Ruling on
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike denying Finan's motion for
summary judgment, granting Adams' cross-motion for summary judgment and holding
2

For purposes of this appeal, Adams will refer to Finan, Christine Helfrich and
Mary Ann Chesarek as ("Finan").
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that there was no dispute as to any material issue of fact relevant to the Court's
determination. (R. 389-397).
The district court held that:
•

The language of the Note was clear and unambiguous;

•

Adams transferred the title to the subject Property on January 22, 1999;

•

Adams duly recorded the transfer of the Property on January 22, 1999;

•

Finan filed her Complaint on September 14, 2007, approximately eight (8) years
and eight (8) months after the transfer;

•

The six-year statute of limitations contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-309(2)
was applicable, and began to run on January 22, 1999;

•

Adams did not conceal the 1999 transfer;

•

Finan did not submit any competent evidence to create a genuine issue that
Adams' conduct was misleading; and,

•

There did not exist any exceptional circumstances that would justify an equitable
tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. (R. 393-394).
The district court denied Adams' request for fees, stating that an award of fees

would have been a windfall. (R. 395). On or about April 7, 2011, the district court filed
its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 409). Also on April 7,
2011, the district court filed its Final Judgment. (R. 417).
On or about June 24, 2011, Finan filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order
("Rule 60 Motion") and supporting memorandum claiming to have newly discovered

evidence. (R. 437 and 439). The Rule 60 Motion was based upon Finan's allegedly new
discovery of the Petition to Approve Payment of Promissory Note and Authorize Partial
Distribution of Estate (the "Petition") filed by Adams on or about November 21, 2006, as
the personal representative of his sister, Frankie A. Emley's ("Emley") estate. (R. 467).
On or about January 6, 2012, the district court denied the Rule 60 Motion. (R.
572). The district court held that Finan's arguments pertaining to Rule 60(b) lacked merit
and were misplaced for various reasons. (R. 574-575). Finan appeals.
Statement of Relevant Facts:
Adams has two sisters, Finan and Emley, both of whom are now deceased. (R.
196). Upon the death of their mother, Leona Adams, in 1985, Adams, Finan and Emley
drew lots to determine which portion of their mother's estate they were to receive. (R.
196). As part of his inheritance, Adams received the Property. (R. 196).
Soon after the Property was conveyed to Adams, Finan caused the Note to be
drafted and requested that Adams sign it. (R. 196). On or about May 13, 1991, Adams
signed the Note in favor of Finan and Emley for the principal amount of $26,340.00
(approximately 20% of the value of the Property) at 0% interest per annum, no due date
and secured by the Property and water shares. (R. 202-204). Also on May 13, 1991,
Adams signed the Trust Deed. (R. 206-207). On or about May 15, 1991, the Trust Deed
was duly recorded with the Davis County Recorder as Entry No. 927132 at Book 1412
beginning at Page 474. (R. 206).
Paragraph A of the Note states that, "In the event the title to the [Property].. .is
sold, assigned or transferred for any reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining
580899.2
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balance of this note is immediately due and payable." (R. 202). Paragraph D of the Note
states, in relevant part, that the Note is "due and payable upon sale, assignment or
transfer" of the Property. (R. 203).
On January 22, 1999, pursuant to a Quit Claim Deed, Adams transferred the
Property to himself and his wife, Diana C. Adams, as joint tenants (the "1999 Transfer").
(R. 197 and 209). There was no money involved in the 1999 Transfer. (R.197). Adams
caused the Quit Claim Deed for the 1999 Transfer to be recorded with the Davis County
Recorder. (R. 197). The Quit Claim Deed was stamped recorded on January 22, 1999, at
Book 2434, Page 876. (R. 209).
On February 22, 2006, Emley passed away and bequeathed Adams her entire
interest in the Note. (R. 509, 197, 469 and 508). Adams was appointed by the court as
personal representative of Emley's Estate. (R. 467 and 508). On or about October 19,
2006, Adams filed the Petition Regarding Estate Assets. (R. 508).
On or about November 21, 2006, almost eight years after the 1999 Transfer
occurred, Adams, as the personal representative of Emley's estate, filed the Petition. (R.
467). In the Petition, Adams asserted, in part, the Note was not currently due and payable
because no portion of the Property had been sold and no event of transfer had occurred.
(R. 468). On or about December 6, 2006, Finan filed her Objection to the Petition
denying Adams'statements. (R. 517-518).
Finan's counsel received a copy of the Petition on November 21, 2006. (R. 473).
Additionally, in a letter dated February 7, 2007 from Finan's counsel to Adams' counsel,
Finan's counsel references his receipt of the Order Regarding Approval of Payment of

Promissory Note and Authorizing Partial Distribution of Estate. (R. 487).
On September 11, 2007, Finan filed her Complaint against Adams alleging that
Adams had not sold the Property but had transferred the property to himself and his wife
as joint tenants. (R. 2-3). Finan included causes of action for Breach of Contract and
Foreclosure of Trust Deed, (R. 3-4), and sought an order judicially foreclosing the
Property and awarding damages and fees. (R. 5). Finan filed her Complaint
approximately eight (8) years and eight (8) months after the 1999 Transfer had taken
place. (R. 392).
In neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint does Finan allege any fraud,
concealment or any misleading conduct on behalf of Adams relative to the recording of
the 1999 Transfer. (R. 1 and 65). In fact, Finan alleges that "[o]n or about 22 January
1999, Defendant [Adams] transferred the property to himself and Diana C. Adams, as
joint tenants. This deed was recorded as Entry No. 1480548, Book No. 2434, Page No.
876 with the Davis County Recorder." (R. 68).
In filing her Rule 60 Motion, Finan again argued that Utah's equitable discovery
rule should toll the applicable statute of limitations, (R. 439), and asserted that Ms.
Chesarek discovered the Petition in April 2011 among her mother's assets. (R. 477).
Finan, Emley and Adams agreed that the value of the Property as of October 1,
1990, as set forth in the Trust Deed Note, was $129,942.00. (R. 111). Finan and Emley's
secured interest in the Property was 20.27 percent ($26,340.00 divided by $129,942). (R.
111). There was no money involved in the 1999 Transfer so a fair market price was not
determined. (Pv. 197). On June 24, 2010, Finan hired Intermountain Valuation Group,
580899.2
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LLC, to provide a market value of the Property as of May 12, 2010. (R. 121 and 123).
Intermountain Valuation Group presented a report valuing the Property at $1,250,000.00
as of May 12, 2010. (R. 123). The value of the Property in 1999, the time of the 1999
Transfer, has not been determined. The five sales comparisons were all transacted in
2009 and notably the parcels were all different sizes and in cities other than Layton, Utah.
(R. 158).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Because Finan's causes of action accrued more than six years prior to the time that
she filed suit, her claims are time-barred. Additionally, because Finan had notice of her
claims before the limitation period ran and because Adams did not engage in any
fraudulent or misleading conduct, and because no other exceptional circumstances apply,
Utah's equitable discovery rule is not available to toll the statute of limitations on Finan's
claims. Because Finan's claims are time-barred, the district court did not err in denying
her motion for summary judgment. Finally, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102 is not void for
vagueness and did not deprive Finan of her due process rights.
ARGUMENTS
I.

The 1999 Transfer Triggered Adams' Payment Obligations Under the Note.
Under the plain language of the Note, the 1999 Transfer triggered Adams'

payment obligation under paragraphs A and D of the Note.

3

Despite asserting that the 1999 Transfer triggered Adams' payment obligations under
the Note (Appellant's Brief, at p. 7, ^ 18 and Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 88),
Finan alternatively argues that the 1999 Transfer was not an event that triggered Adams'

"Well-accepted rules of contract interpretation require that we examine the
language of a contract to determine meaning and intent" and "[w]here the language is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Glenn v.
Reese, 2009 UT 80, If 10, 225 P.3d 185. "If the language within the four corners of the
contract is unambiguous, then a court does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the
contract's meaning, and a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning
of the contractual language as a matter of law." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc.,
2002 UT 62, f 16, 52 P.3d 1179; see Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) ("[t]he plain meaning rule preserves the intent
of the parties and protects the contract against judicial revision"). Furthermore, a court
will not "avoid the contract's plain language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Id. at \ 19
(citation omitted). Finally, "[i]n interpreting contracts, the ordinary and usual meaning of
the words used is given effect, which ordinary meaning . . . is often best determined
through standard, non-legal dictionaries." South Ridge Homeowners' Ass 'n v. Brown,
2010 UT App 23,11, 226 P.3d 758 (quotation omitted).
Paragraph A of the Note provides that "[i]n the event the title to the [Property].. .is
sold, assigned or transferred^or any reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining
balance of this note is immediately due and payable." (R. 202) (emphasis added).

payment obligations under the Note. Appellant's Brief, at p. 22. If true, Plaintiffs
causes of action would fail because they would not be ripe. If no transfer has occurred
under the Note, then no breach of the Note has occurred.

580899.2
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Paragraph D of the Note states, in relevant part, that the Note is "due and payable upon
sale, assignment or transfer" of the Property. (R. 203).
"Transfer" is defined in Webster's New World Dictionary as: "1 To convey, carry,
remove, or send from one person, place, or position to another 2 to make over or convey
(property, title to property, etc.) to another . . . 7 Law a) the transferring of a title, right,
etc. from one person to another". WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1420 (3d
college ed. 1988).
On January 22, 1999, Adams transferred the Property from himself as sole owner
in fee simple absolute to himself and his wife as joint tenants. (R. 115 and 197). The
Note speaks clearly and unambiguously concerning the character of event that would
trigger Adams' payment obligations under the Note; both paragraph A and paragraph D
of the Note provide that if the Property is transferred in any way - by sale, transfer or
disposition — then the amounts due thereunder will be immediately due and payable.
Because the 1999 Transfer satisfies the plain meaning language of the Note, the Court did
not err in holding that the Note clearly and unambiguously obligated Adams to make
immediate payment to Finan upon the transfer of the Property for any reason or in any
manner. (R. 392) (emphasis added).
Because the language of the Note is unambiguous, the Court need not entertain
Finan's argument that the 1999 Transfer is "not the kind of transfer anticipated and
mentioned in the original Note." Appellant's Brief, at p. 23. Neither at the district court
level nor here at the appellate court level has Finan asserted that the Note is anything
other than clear and unambiguous.

Additionally, the fact that Adams still maintained an ownership interest in the
Property after the 1999 Transfer does not also mean that no transfer took place. The
rights and privileges attendant to Adam's ownership in the Property after the 1999
Transfer changed drastically from that of fee simple absolute to that enjoyed in a joint
tenancy in a fee simple estate. Finan correctly notes that "[u]nder a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship, if [Adams'] wife died, [Adams] himself would retain sole
possession of the [P]roperty." Appellants' Brief, at p. 23. Finan neglects to point out that
the opposite is also true; Adams' wife would have enjoyed a full ownership interest in the
Property had she outlived Adams. Shiba v. Shiba, 2008 UT 33, Tf 17, 186 P.3d 329 ("It is
well settled that under a joint tenancy, both parties hold a concurrent ownership in the
same property with a right of survivorship, i.e., each is afforded the eventuality of a full
ownership interest, conditioned upon the tenancy remaining unsevered, and one outliving the other") (quotation omitted).
Additionally, after the 1999 Transfer, Adams' wife could have severed the joint
tenancy by conveying her interest in the Property. Id. ("[i]t is also well settled that a joint
tenant of real property by conveying . . . his interest therein by a valid deed . . . severs and
terminates the joint tenancy by the creation of a tenancy in common") (quotation
omitted). "This is true even when the joint tenants are husband and wife: Since the rights
of each spouse are alienable, any purchaser or encumbrancer does not become a joint
tenant in the property, but becomes a tenant-in-common with the remaining spouse."
Franklin Credit Management Corp. v. Hanney, 2011 UT App 213, f 18, 262 P.3d 406
(quotation omitted).
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Finally, Adams is not judicially estopped from arguing that the 1999 Transfer
triggered Adams' payment obligations under the Note notwithstanding the statements
contained in the Petition. The elements of judicial estoppel are "(1) the prior and
subsequent litigation involve the same parties . . . (2) the prior and subsequent litigation
involve the same subject matter; (3) the prior position was successfully maintained; and
(4) the party seeking judicial estoppel has relied upon the prior testimony and changed his
position by reason of it." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 11, 177 P.3d 600 (quotation
omitted). Finan's assertion that Adams should be estopped from arguing that the 1999
Transfer triggered his payment obligations under the Note fails because Finan did not
rely on the Petition and did not change her position because of it. Adams filed the
Petition on or about November 21, 2006, nearly seven years after the 1999 Transfer.
(R.467). The Petition asserted that the Note was not currently due and that the Property
had not been sold. (R. 468-467).
Regardless of the statements contained in the Petition, Finan cannot establish the
elements of judicial estoppel because (1) the Petition was filed after the statute of
limitations on her claims had already expired, see Section II infra, and (2) Finan denied
Adams' statements that the Note was not currently due and that the Property had not been
sold. (R. 517-518). Finan cannot claim to have relied upon the Petition or changed her
position when she denied the accuracy of the statements contained therein.
Because the 1999 Transfer constitutes a "transfer" under the plain language of the
Note, the Court correctly held that Adam's repayment obligation under the Note arose on
January 22, 1999, the same date on which Finan's causes of action accrued.

II.

The Statute of Limitations on Finan's Claims Expired on January 22, 2005.
Because Adams' payment obligations under the Note immediately arose on the

date of the 1999 Transfer and because Adams failed to make any payment under the
Note, Finan's claims became time-barred when she failed to institute an action by
January 22, 2005.
It is uncontroverted that Finan's claims against Adams are based on a written
contract, the Note. (R. 69, 91 and 392). Finan's Amended Complaint asserts that Adams
triggered his payment obligation under the Note on January 22, 1999, when he conveyed
the Property to himself and his wife as joint tenants and, thereby, breached the terms of
the Note by not immediately paying Finan the principal amount owing at that time. (R.
68, 92, 94 and 392-393).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-2-309(2) prescribes a six-year statute of limitations

"upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing." Id.
The district court held that the 1999 Transfer triggered Adams' payment obligation under
the Note and that the statute of limitations applicable to Finan's claims was the six-year
statute contained in Section 78B-2-309(2).
Generally, "a cause of action accrues and the statutes of limitations begin running
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action."
Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, % 12, 78 P.3d 616 (citation
omitted). In a breach of contract action, the "statute of limitations ordinarily begins to
run when the breach occurs." Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 2005 UT App 225, ]f 9,
114 P.3d 602 (quotation omitted). "Once a statute has begun to run, a plaintiff must file
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his or her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will be barred." Russell
PackardDev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, \ 20, 108 P.3d 74 (internal citations omitted).
"Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither prevent the running of
the statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim within the relevant
statutory period." Id.
Paragraph A of the Note provides that "[i]n the event the title to the [Property].. .is
sold, assigned or transferredybr any reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining
balance of this note is immediately due and payable." (R. 202) (emphasis added).
Paragraph D of the Note states, in relevant part, that the Note is "due and payable upon
sale, assignment or transfer" of the Property. (R.203). As previously discussed, Adams'
payment obligation under the Note arose upon the completion of the 1999 Transfer. As a
result, Finan's claims accrued, and the statute of limitations began, when Adams failed to
make immediate payment to Finan following the 1999 Transfer. (R. 393 and 413-416).
This is so regardless of whether Finan had notice of the 1999 Transfer.4
Finan filed her Complaint to enforce the Note on September 11, 2007—more than
eight years after the 1999 Transfer. Because more than six years passed between the
accrual of Finan's causes of action, on January 22, 1999, and the filing of Finan's
Complaint, Finan's causes of action are time-barred.

4

As established below, Finan had notice of the 1999 Transfer by operation of law. UTAH
CODE ANN. §57-3-102.

III.

The District Court Correctly Held that Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule is
Inapplicable.
To support Finan's argument that the six-year statute of limitations on her claims

should have been equitably tolled, Finan contends (1) that Adams concealed the 1999
Transfer from her5 and (2) that she did not have notice of Adams' breach of the Note.6
Both contentions fail. As a preliminary matter a plaintiff must first make "the threshold
showing that [she] did not know, nor should have known of its causes of action against
the [the defendant] prior to being put on notice of a potential fraudulent transaction."
Russell/PackardDev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, f t 15-16, 78 P.3d 616.
Finan fails to make this threshold showing because of Adams' recordation of the
Quit Claim Deed documenting the 1999 Transfer; Finan had notice of the 1999 Transfer.
Furthermore, Finan would not have had any difficulty in recognizing and discovering her
causes of action had she periodically checked the records of the Davis County Recorder's
office relative to the Property. A review of the records once every five years would have
been enough to protect Finan's contractual interests. While Finan has not met the
threshold showing, even if she had, equitable tolling would still not be available because
Finan had notice of the 1999 Transfer, Adams did not engage in any concealing or
misleading conduct, and no other exceptional circumstances exist.
Even if a plaintiff makes the required threshold showing, equitable tolling is only
available in one of two situations; "a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of
5

Appellant's Brief, at pp. 13-22.

6

Appellant's Brief, at pp. 10-13.
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action because o/the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct or . . . the case
presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be
irrational or unjust." Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, t 23, 223 P.3d 1128 (emphasis
added). Stated conversely, if a plaintiff is (1) aware of her cause of action or (2) unaware
of her cause of action for any reason other than the defendant's concealment or
misleading conduct, the equitable discovery rule is unavailable.
A.

Finan Produced No Competent Evidence of Fraud or Concealment.

Because Finan has failed to produce any competent evidence that she was unaware
of her cause of action because of Adams' concealment or misleading conduct, the
equitable discovery rule is inapplicable. This is so even when the facts and all reasonable
Q

inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to Finan.
In its Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, the
district court determined that there was "no dispute as to any material issue of fact
relevant to the Court's determination," including the facts of the 1999 Transfer, the time
between the 1999 Transfer and when Finan filed her action. See Sanns v. Butter field
Ford, 2004 UT App 203, \ 6, 94 P.3d 301 ("A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the
basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's
conduct measures up to the required standard . . . Furthermore, the mere existence of

7

Finan asserts that "[a]t the trial level, the case turned on initial incorrect findings of
fact." Appellant's Brief, at p. 1. Finan is incorrect as the Court did not make any
findings of fact but merely determined that there were no material facts in dispute.
"Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, % 8, 152 P.3d 312.

genuine issues of fact. . . does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those
issues are immaterial to resolution of the case") (quotations and citation omitted).
The district court also held that,
it is undisputed that Defendant did not conceal the 1999 transfer of title
based on his recording of the quit claim deed on January 22, 1999, which
placed Ms. Finan on constructive notice of the transfer and accrual of her
causes of action. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not
submitted any competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Defendant's conduct was misleading.
(R.394).
The only factual occurrences cited by Finan to support her assertion that Adams
acted fraudulently are (1) Adams' alleged violation of the "spirit" of the Note in not
directly notifying Finan of the 1999 Transfer (Appellant's Brief, at p. 16) and (2) the
Petition filed in November 2006. Id.
First, because Adams had no duty or obligation to notify Finan of the 1999
Transfer, the fact that he did not notify Finan of the 1999 Transfer is not evidence of
concealment or misleading conduct. Although generally thought of in the context of
liability for fraud by concealment, Utah law provides that liability for nondisclosure is
premised on a duty to disclose in the first place. First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v.
BanberryDev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1990). A duty to disclose exists only
where there are special circumstances such as a fiduciary or other dependant relationship.
Id. at 1330. Where a transaction is at arm's length and the relevant facts are available to
both parties, a defendant does not have a duty of disclosure. Rather, in such
circumstances the plaintiff has an obligation to conduct an investigation and inform itself
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of relevant facts. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) ("A duty to speak will not be found where the parties deal at arm's length, and
where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under
such circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself,
and to protect his own interests") (quoting Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d
1369, 1373 (Utah 1980).
Finan's claim that she did not receive actual notice from Adams regarding the
1999 Transfer is immaterial to this case. (R. 111-113). Under the plain language of the
Note,9 Adams did not have a contractual duty to provide Finan actual notice of a transfer
of ownership. (R. 108-109 and 111-113). Neither the Note, the Trust Deed nor Utah law
imposed any duty on Adams to provide notice of the 1999 Transfer to Finan, personally
or directly. Because Adams had no duty to notify Finan of the 1999 Transfer, his failure
to do so cannot constitute fraudulent or misleading conduct.
Second, because the Petition was filed after the statute of limitations applicable to
Finan's claims had run, even assuming that Finan was unaware of her cause of action,
this unawareness could not have been caused by the Petition. Finan devotes a significant
portion of her brief to the argument that the Petition constituted fraudulent and
misleading conduct. Despite the extensive attention paid to the Petition by Finan, the
Petition cannot form the basis for application of the equitable discovery rule for one
9

Because the Note is clear and unambiguous, Finan's statement that "the expectation of
the parties was that these siblings would deal openly and honestly with one another in
order to effect an equitable distribution of their mother's estate" at Appellant's Brief, at p.
16, is irrelevant. See Bakowski, 2002 UT 62, at Tf 16.

simple reason: the Petition was filed after the statute of limitations applicable to Finan's
claims had already expired.
As a result, even assuming that the Petition would otherwise constitute fraudulent
or misleading conduct, it cannot be used to equitably toll the limitations period because
that period had already expired before the Petition was filed. The equitable discovery
rule can only apply when the plaintiffs lack of awareness of her cause of action results
because o/the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct. See Martino, 2009 UT
87, at f 23 (emphasis added). Therefore, Finan's assertion that Adams' conduct in
"conceal[ing] not one, but two transfers, and [lying] in his Petition to the court regarding
the transfers"10 meets the "rule requiring] an evaluation of the reasonableness of a
plaintiffs conduct in light of the defendant's fraudulent or misleading conduct" fails.
Even had Finan met this threshold standard that allows a court to evaluate the
reasonableness of her conduct, she has not made any contention that she acted
reasonably. Finan offers no description of her conduct, only that Adams allegedly
concealed not one but two transfers and the irrelevant Petition.
In Re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129 {"Hoopiiaina IF\ the Utah
Supreme Court restated the element of reasonableness of a plaintiff s conduct in light of
the defendant's fraudulent or misleading conduct. Hoopiiaina II} 2006 UT 53, at \ 36.
The Court also stated that, "if the plaintiff can make such a demonstration, the statute of
limitations will not commence running until the date the plaintiff possessed actual or

10

Appellant's Brief, at p. 18.
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constructive knowledge of the facts forming the basis of his or her cause of action." Id.
at | 36. Even if Finan was able to meet the concealment and reasonable conduct
elements set forth in Russell/Packard and Hoopiiaina II, the statute of limitations on her
claims against Adams would not be tolled because she had constructive notice of the
1999 Transfer based upon Adams' recording of the Quit Claim Deed with the Davis
County Recorder.
Because Finan has produced no competent evidence of concealment or misleading
conduct, the equitable discovery rule is inapplicable.
B.

Finan had Notice of her Claims Within the Limitations Period.

By virtue of Utah's recording statute, Finan had notice of her claims six years
before they became time-barred. As a result, the equitable discovery rule is not available
to Finan.
Under Utah law, "[t]he discovery rule has no application when an action easily
could have been filed between the date of discovery and the end of the limitation period."
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987). In cases
"not involving allegations of concealment, inquiry notice on the part of the plaintiff is
enough to trigger the running of the limitations period." Russell/Packard Dev.} Inc. v.
Carson, 2003 UT App 316, f 15, 78 P.3d 616; see Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers
Owners Ass 'n, 2002 UT App 332,1j 23, 57 P.3d 119 ("Constructive notice is imparted
when documents are properly recorded"); see also Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278,
1J24, 9%9V2&6\\ First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah
1998); In Re Hiseman, 330 B.R. 251, 255-256 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005).

As set forth in Section IRA., supra, Finan failed to set forth any competent
evidence of concealment. As a result, inquiry notice is sufficient to defeat Finan's claim
that the equitable discovery rule applies to her claims. Under Utah law, all persons,
including Finan, had notice of the 1999 Transfer by virtue of Adams' recordation of the
Quit Claim Deed on January 22, 1999. (R. 115, 392). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102.
Finan's arguments that UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102 did not provide her with
notice of the 1999 Transfer are unpersuasive.
First, Finan argues that Section 57-3-102 "has no applicability to the contractual
nature of the instant case .. . [t]he Note itself is not a deed but is instead a contract and
thus is not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102." Appellant's Brief, at p.10-11.
Finan's focus on whether or not the Note is a deed11 and whether or not the Note is
"subject to Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102" is misplaced. To be certain, section 57-3-102's
declaration that all persons are deemed to have notice of the contents of a recorded
document does not define what constitutes a breach of the Note and does not govern if,
and when, a cause of action on the Note accrued. As previously discussed, any transfer
of the Property and the accompanying failure to pay under the Note constituted a breach
of the Note, and that cause of action accrued with or without notice of the breach. The
only relevance of section 57-3-102's notice component to this case is that it defeats
Finan's assertion that she was not aware of her cause of action before the limitations
period expired for purposes of her argument that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the

11

It is not.
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statute of limitations.
Second, Finan argues that the Utah recording statute "imparts notice 'of their
contents,' not of the event of transfer which triggers a contract breach and running of a
contract statute of limitations." Appellant's Brief, at pp. 10-11. Even if Adams'
recordation of the Quit Claim Deed only imparted notice of its contents and not that the
contract had been breached, the contents of the Quit Claim Deed would reveal that a
transfer, and thus a breach under the Note, had occurred. Adams' recordation of the Quit
Claim Deed recorded the transfer of the Property.
Whether or not the Quit Claim Deed included specific notice of the Note's breach,
the fact remains that notice of the 1999 Transfer, and thus the Note's breach, was
imputed based on section 57-3-102. The parties to the Note opted to designate any
transfer of the Property as a breach of the Note and the recordation of the Trust Deed
gave Finan notice of the 1999 Transfer and Adams' breach of the Note. Again, whether
or not Finan had notice of her claim does not affect when her cause of action accrued,
only whether she is entitled to equitable tolling.
Third, based on Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302
(Utah App 1984) and Timothy v. Keetch, 2011 UT App 104, f 12, 251 P.3d 848, Finan
argues that she "was under no duty to check with the Davis County Recorder's Office on
a day-to-day basis." Appellant's Brief, at p. 12. Finan's argument is misplaced as both
Christenson and Keetch are easily distinguishable.
Finan herself distinguishes Christenson by admitting that the facts underlying the
case are "not directly on point with the instant case [while] the thrust of its language

remains." Appellant's Brief, at p. 12. Finan's concession notwithstanding, the facts
underlying Christenson are sufficiently different from this case so as to make that case's
holding

completely inapplicable. The key distinction between this case and those facts

underlying the Christenson decision lies in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs
supposed duty to review real property records and the circumstances giving rise to this
duty.
In Christenson, the court noted that a purchaser is not required to review real
property records to verify the truthfulness of affirmative statements made by a selling
party at the time that the parties enter into the contract. Id. at 307. Unlike the situation
where one party is relying on the affirmative misstatements of another in entering into a
business transaction, the instant case does not involve a misrepresentation made in the
context of the consummation of a transaction but instead events that occur subsequent to
the parties' dealings. On one hand, review of the real property records would have made
a difference at the time that the parties entered into the contract, while on the other,
review of the records would only show evidence of the contract's breach. In other words,
the status of the real property records was not relevant to the Note's formation, only to its
breach.
Finan's reliance on Keetch is similarly misplaced. In Keetch, the court held that
"[i]n general, Utah law does not require one to inspect the public record to verify the

12

"[A] plaintiff who contracts to buy property is under no duty to examine public records
to ascertain the true state of title claimed by the seller." Christenson, 666 P.2d 302, 307
(Utah 1983).
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truthfulness of statements made to him or her. Timothy v. Keetch, 2011 UT App 104, at
Ti 12. The fraudulent misstatement made in Keetch occurred at or before the time that the
parties' entered into a contract. Id. at U 5 ("Paul asked Teri if the Horse was encumbered
in any way. Teri stated that the Horse was not encumbered"). Finan does not allege that
Adams made misrepresentations to her at or before the time that the Note was executed.
In fact, other than the Petition that was filed after the statute of limitations had already
run, Finan makes no allegation that Adams made any misstatement to Finan.
Finan's interest in reviewing the records of the Davis County Recorder's office
was not to verify whether a party with whom Finan was going to contract was telling the
truth but instead to protect her right to assert her rights in court by ascertaining whether
Adams had breached the Note by transferring the Property and failing to pay. Where the
occurrence of a breach of the Note would be evidenced by a recorded document, the real
property records would provide a sure way to ascertain whether or not a breach had
occurred. See Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc. v. Watson, 2007 UT App 383, ^f 13, 174
P.3d 647 ("The purpose of recording a trust deed is to provide notice of a security interest
in the property to lenders, beneficiaries, or subsequent purchasers"). The notice of the
recording statute protects more than transferees, it protects parties who have or may have
an interest in the property, like Finan had as collateral in the Note.
Finan simply misstates the issue regarding the 1999 Transfer and its recordation
with the Davis County Recorder and misapplies the holdings and applicability of
Christenson and Timothy to the case at bar.
Fourth, Finan's attempt to "demonstrate the absurdity of the court's conclusions"

also fails. Appellant's Brief, at p. 12. Finan's hypothetical in which contracts would be
recorded and then with constructive notice "defeat the contract embodied within the
document" is not instructive. Utah's recording statute, in the same fashion of western
civilization since ancient England, provides notice of priority, interest and ownership of
real property. Filing documents evidences ownership interest (equitable and legal), such
as a deed, and through the recording statute provides all persons notice of ownership,
interest and in appropriate circumstances, transfers and conveyances. If this Court or any
court would implement what Finan is suggesting, it would result in chaos. If the
recording of interests and priorities in real property were deemed not to provide notice to
all, fraud would run rampant. Lenders could not rely on their negotiated priority of
collateral. Purchasers would not have any confidence in the purchase transactions in
which they entered. Fee ownership would be unenforceable.
Finally, Finan claims the district court found that "Finan lacked due diligence by
failing to discover . . . and no triggering event occurred that would give rise to inquiry
notice." Appellant's Brief, at p. 11-12.13 Nowhere in the record does the district court
state that Finan lacked due diligence by failing to discover the 1999 Transfer for eight
years or that no triggering event occurred. Clearly, the termed "triggering event" for
Finan's cause of action was the 1999 Transfer, memorialized by the Quit Claim Deed
recorded by Adams on January 22, 1999.

13

Appellant cites to the Record at pages 609 and 611 for this statement. Appellant's
Brief, at p. 12. Appellant cites to numbers in the 600's throughout her brief. However,
the official record ends at 578 and does not include pages 609 or 611.
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For all of the emphasis Finan places on UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102, its only
potential impact on this case is whether Finan can satisfy the equitable discovery's rule
requirement that she not be aware of her cause of action. It does nothing to address the
requirement that the lack of awareness be caused by fraudulent and misleading conduct.
In order to satisfy the requirements of the equitable discovery rule because of fraudulent
conduct, a plaintiff must show both that she was not aware of the cause of action and that
she was unaware of her claim because of the defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct. Finan has shown neither.
C.

This Case Does Not Present Exceptional Circumstances.

Finally, Finan also claims to meet the exceptional circumstances exception to the
discovery rule applicable even when a plaintiff either knew or reasonably should have
known of the facts underlying her cause of action before a limitations period expired.
Russell PackardDev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,130, 108 P.3d 741.
Finan admits that her case is stronger under the concealment prong of the
equitable discovery rule, but asserts that the following constitute the exceptional
circumstances sufficient to support application of the equitable discovery rule: the
familial relation between the parties; Adams taking a larger portion of their parents'
estate; the statements contained in the Petition; and the expectations of honesty among
family members. Appellant's Brief, at p. 22. Finan does not adequately support her
claim that these circumstances, even if true, meet the exceptional circumstances standard
for equitable tolling.
The doctrine of equitable tolling should not be used simply to rescue

litigants who have inexcusably and unreasonably slept on their rights, but
rather to prevent the expiration of claims to litigants who, through no fault
of their own, have been unable to assert their rights within the limitations
period.
Beaver Cnty. v. Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm % 2006 UT 6, \ 32, 128
P.3d 1187. Because Finan's claimed exceptional circumstances are insufficient to
warrant the extraordinary remedy requested, the Court did not err in holding that the
equitable discovery rule was inapplicable.
IV.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Finan's Rule 60
Motion,
The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60 Motion. Under Rule

60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may
In the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (2) fraud . . .
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 60.

After the district court granted Adams' motion for summary judgment and
denied Finan's, and after Finan filed her Notice of Appeal, Finan filed her Rule 60
Motion. The Rule 60 Memo was based upon Ms. Helfrich's alleged discovery of
the Petition after the district court had ruled on the parties' motions for summary
judgment.
Regarding the allegedly newly discovered Petition, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the Rule 60 Motion because Finan did not show that she could
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not have discovered the Petition by exercising due diligence. Additionally, as the
successor and representative of Finan, Ms. Helfrich stepped into the shoes of Finan with
all of Finan's knowledge imputed to her. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-703(3); see Parks v.
Zions First Nat'I Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 603 (Utah 1983) (personal representative stands in
the same position of the decedent had the decedent lived); see also, Lemberg v. Tuuk,
Civ. No. 06-CV-00259-MSK-MEH, 2006 WL 1684663, * 4 (D. Colo. June 13, 2006)
(unreported) ("the personal representative of a decedent's estate stands in the decedent's
shoes for purposes of having authority to bring such a suit") (internal citation omitted).
In fact, the Petition was filed in Emley's probate proceeding and was served on Finan's
counsel.
Regarding Finan's contention that Adams' acted fraudulently, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60 Motion because Finan denied Adams'
factual averments in the Petition, thus indicating her lack of reliance thereon, and because
the Petition was filed after the statute of limitations on Finan's claims expired.
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Finan's Rule
60(b)(6) request because subsection (b)(6) "is meant to operate as a residuary clause
[and] may not be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other
subsection of rule 60(b)." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, % 71, 150 P.3d 480.
Additionally, Rule 60(b)(6) relief "is meant to be the exception rather than the rule;
[courts] have previously held that it should be sparingly invoked and used only in unusual
and exceptional circumstances." Id. (quotations omitted).
Finally, because the Petition was filed after the statute of limitations applicable to

Finan's claims had expired, the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60
Motion because the existence of the Petition would not have altered the Court's analysis
of the applicability of the statute of limitations. For the same reasons that Finan does not
satisfy the second and third versions of the equitable discovery rule discussed in
Russell/PackardDev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, ^| 139 78 P.3d 616, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Finan's Rule 60 Motion.
V.

The District Court Correctly Denied Finan's Motion for Summary Judgment
As previously argued, the six-year statute of limitations applicable to Finan's

causes of action expired before she filed her Complaint and the equitable discovery rule
does not apply. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Finan's motion for
summary judgment.
Even if Finan's claims had not been time-barred and had she prevailed on the
elements of her underlying claims, Finan's damages theory that Adams pay her
$126,418.30 (10.135% of $1.25 million) and attorneys' fees is flawed. At the time of the
execution of the Note, Finan, Emley and Adams agreed to a valuation of the Property, as
of October 1, 1990, of $129,942.00. There was no money involved in the 1999 Transfer,
so a fair market price was not determined. On June 24, 2010, Finan hired Intermountain
Valuation Group, LLC, to provide a market value of the Property as of May 12, 2010.
The five sales comparisons were all in 2009 and the parcels were all in different cities.
Intermountain Valuation Group presented a report valuing the Property at $1,250,000.00
as of May 12, 2010. Finan seeks 10.135% of this amount.
The correct theory of damages would involve calculating 10.135% of the
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Property's value as of January 22, 1999, the day on which payment was due to Finan
under the Note, and not on May 12, 2010. In the event this Court remands this matter to
the district court, it should instruct the district court to allow the parties to ascertain the
value of the Property at the time of the 1999 Transfer.
VI.

Utah's Recording Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102, is Constitutional.
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, the Court presumes that the

statute is constitutional. State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, f 18, 224 P.3d 720.
Finan did not raise her constitutional argument before the district court and did not
preserve this issue for appellate review.14 O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ^ 15, 217 P.3d
704; Holman v. Callister, Duncan &Nebekery 905 P.2d 895, 899 (Utah Ct. App.1995)
(stating that a litigant's failure to raise an issue with the district court fails to preserve the
claim for appeal); UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) (stating that to challenge an issue on appeal,
a party must make an argument containing "the contentions and reasons" along with
"citations to the authorities"); 1438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, U 51, 99
P.3d 801 ("Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived.").
Besides not being preserved, Finan's constitutional arguments are inadequately
briefed as they only make superficial statements that section 57-3-102 "is too broad in
scope, is unconstitutionally vague" and violates "substantive and procedural due process
rights as well." Appellant's Brief, at pp. 24-25. "It is well established that a reviewing
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961

14

Appellant's Brief, at p.3.

P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)
("A brief must contain some support for each contention. Wareham's brief totally fails to
provide any reasons to support the contention that the statute is vague. We therefore
must disregard this issue"); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)
(declining to rule on separation of powers argument where argument was not supported
by any legal analysis or authority). Finan's constitutionality argument contains bald
assertions with no support or legal authority to support her positions. Her constitutional
arguments are not adequately briefed.
Moreover, the Recording Statute is not vague as applied because it imparts fair
notice to "all persons" of the contents of a recorded document. Wareham, 772 P.2d at
966 ("As a general proposition, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is
broad. The essential test is whether the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is
prohibited"); State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 43, 99 P.3d 820 ("The constitution tolerates a
greater degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal statutes"). The statute's
notice provision applies whether or not the recorded document only impacts title to real
property or, as in this case, also evidences a transfer that breaches a contract.
Nor did the Recording Statute violate Finan's due process rights. "Generally, we
apply a rational basis test in substantive due process cases." Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT
91, % 30, 103 P.3d 135. Because predictability and certainty in matters affecting title to
real property is a legitimate government interest, Finan's substantive due process claim
fails. Regarding procedural due process, the Utah Constitution "guarantees minimal
requirements of notice and a hearing where there are significant interests of life, liberty,
580899.2

32

or property at stake." State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, Tf 13, 245 P.3d 745. The extensive
proceedings afforded Finan in the district court satisfy the Constitution's due process
requirements.
Finally, the Court need not address Finan's constitutional argument because it is
not necessary to affirm the district court's decision. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, at \ 18
("courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other
grounds"). Because the Recording Statute only becomes relevant when analyzing
Finan's argument concerning the equitable discovery rule, and because Finan is not
entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations regardless of her notice (because she
introduced no competent evidence of fraudulent conduct), the Court need not address
Finan's constitutional arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Adams respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Adams with prejudice and on the
merits.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of July, 2012.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

T. Richard Davis
Thomas B. Price
Benjamin P. Harmon
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Together with ten (10) shares; of. .Davis . and :Weber •• p^'hkl;\.;;;j
Company and ten (10) shares of Stevenson/s .Straight pitch'.CampKhy£;>
water rights,
..
. ' ,'• ''''^;:'...:•.;. ;•;..,.J!Together with all buildings, fixtures and improv^m/entB,/.-,;
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STATE 0.1? UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d * before"' me iiljKE.">ti*VA'^fififtS
f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , , who d u l y / ^ i ^ k n o,,,A/
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e x e c u t e d t h e same;
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*$L-m

j&umc.
Addendum - 2

$

-Yriw

isj i i ti r

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO.NOT DESTROY .THIS NOTE: When paid, this.note, with Trust Deed
securing same, must be surrendered to Trustee for cancellation,
before reconveyance will be made.

$26,340.00
'

Layton, Utah
•• '
'-/-,

1991

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally,
promise to pay to the order of FRANK-IE A. EMLEY and CARMEN R.
FINAN, tenants-in-common, as to a one-half interest each,
Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Forty and No/100 Dollars
($26/340.00), together with interest from date at the rate of
Zero per cent (0%) per annum on the • .unpaid" principal, said
principal and interest payable as"follows:
A. In the event the title to the real property in section
29, T4N, R1W SLB & M, Davis County, Utah, and. more fully
described as follows:
Parcel #1: BEG 366.5 FT W & 33 FT S FR TH NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC
29. T4N-R1W; SLM: TH W 30 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 90 FT, TH N 200
FT, TE W 94.4 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 97.45 FT. TH S 1087 FT, TH E
311.95 FT, TH N 1287 FT TO BEG. CONT, 8.414 ACRES
Parcel #2: BEG AT APT ON S BNDY LN OF LAYTON TOWN;. W 366.5 FT &
S 1320 FT FR NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC 29; T4N-R1W; SLM: TH W 311.95
FT; TH S 836 FT TO E'LY R/W LN OF ORG RY; TH S 33°18/E 545.FT MOL
TO PT DUE S OF BEG; TH N 1275 FT TO BEG, CONT 8.95 ACRES
securing this note is sold, assigned or transferred for any
reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining balance of
this note is immediately due and payable.
B, Payee and maker acknowledge that the-value of the real
property securing this note was, on October 1, 1990, $129,942.00;
and therefore, the ratio of the note value to the property value
is 20.27 percent ($26,340.00 divided by $129,942).

C.
In the event maker sells the real property securing
this note for an amount greater than .$123,942'. 00 then the maker
agrees to pay FRAWKIE A. EMLEY and CARMEN R. FINAJW twenty percent
(20%) of said sales price as the amount due on this note*
Otherwise, the amount due shall be a minimum of $26,340.00.
D. This note shall be due and payable upon sale, assignment
or transfer of the real property and/or water rights securing
this note by Trust Deed of even date herewith or upon the death
of maker or in the event of foreclosure, tax sale, bankruptcy of
maker or any other event of transfer*
E.
Any sale, transfer, assignment, bankruptcy, or
disposition of the property securing this note within twelve (12)
months after this note has been paid off wherein the maker
receives consideration therefore in excess of $129,942.00 will
entitle payees to the incremental additional amount of 20.27
percent of such consideration less $26,340.00 previously paid.
This lien cannot be disposed of' by an act of Bankruptcy by the
Trustor.
P. All payments are to be made -payable to payees and are
to be delivered to them.
Any such payments- not paid- when due shall bear interest
thereafter at the rate of Twelve per cent (12%) per annum until
paid.
If default: occurs in the payment of said Trust Deed JNote
or in the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust
Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option and
without notice or demand, may declare the entire, principal
balance due and payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in
the payment of principal or interest, either with or without
suit, the undersigned agrees to pay all costs and expenses of
collection including a reasonable attorney's fees.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof
severally waive presentment for payment, demand and notice of
dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all
extensions of- time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may
be granted by the. holder hereof with respect to the payment or
other provisions of this 'note, and to the release of any
security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
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This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.
DATED:

,19 91.

,Si /

LUKE L\ ADAMS

^

STATE OF UTAH
: ss
COUNTY OF DAVIS

A-m
day of
On
the
1991,
i K>^personally appeared before me LUKE L. ADAMS, onp of the signer(s)
of the within instrument r who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same,
1
I,
*V Public
Notary

*1

X

Residing at:
My Commission Expires;
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AT TIME OF SCANNING

A
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*-» >-4 • • »-w-k
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*
RETURNED

WKcN StCORD=0 MAIL TO :

JAN 221999

E , i 4 f f 0 4 5 S S-2434P BV<£>
SHERYL U INHITEF DAVIS CNTY RECORDER
1595: JAH';22.;:-3:26.Pn,FEE 10,00 DEP JD.'
REC'D'TOR>ADAttS, LUKE: L.

QUIT CLAIM DEED
LUKE L. ADAMS
Grantor,
of 777-East Gentiie^Layton, Utah 84041

County. State of Utah,

herebyQUiTCLAIM. t•••:' •

:..': : 'CMlKE L ADAMS AND DiANAC ADAMS,
. , -. . husband and wife, as^joint tenants.
Grantee
oti;n:E6ihpeh\)ie;:i^orit
Utah County.of Davis
, State of Utah.
foV.tte^um'ofiTsWEhoilpis a n d othefvgood andvotuoU'e consWerotian, the.-fottov.nng tjoct of land in Davis
Gourtty«=t6^wJt;v;v.'-•. •> *
' ;
,
„,,
'*' r
' - /
* .
*
v,
vBeg!nrir^:3&ifffifeBt" West and 33"feet South from the Northeast* corner of the Northwest <
^Q^:^%^\m^2?r
Townshrpr4iNorth, Range 1 West. Salt Lake Meridian, thence,West
m^;M^0^^^^^^Bet;\}rm(ice
West 90 feel thence,Noritv200.feet. thence
West^^feet^efe&e Soirfh 200<feet; thence Wetf$7.45>et^hence South tQ87<,feet;
•••tfiffi§^Sjt|^ij^fe^ # 1heii6e North 1287 feet to the point of^eginning.
,
';

Subjecrtito easemerifs^resWctlom br»drightsof way appearing of-record or enforceable uvtaw and„equity
djid:199fttaxesand1 thereafter.
*
; * * . . *
,
-, t '
T
,V
W|TNK5-the>hdnd-df4aiiJ grantor, this 22nd day o! January/1999

/^fo>/?> o 4 ^ ^ < ^
LUJCE L:ADAMS

State of Utah
County o^Dp'vis

'-.

'

On the 22hdday : of ; 'January, 1999 . personally appeared before m e l U K E L ADAMS, the signers) of the
foregoing instrument, who duty acknowledged to me'thal he executea/the same.

My Commission:Expires:
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS CO

FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE-Off UIWSTRICT COURT

CHRISTINE B. HELFRICH and MARY
ANNE CHESAREK, Successors and Representatives of THE CARMEN R. FINAN
ESTATE and Trustees of THE CARMEN
R. ADAMS FINAN TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO STRIKE
Civil No. 070700508
Judge John R. Morris

vs.
LUKE L.ADAMS,
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment
and Defendant's motion to strike. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting documentation, and the Court's case file. The Court also
held a hearing on the matters on December 13, 2010. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully advised in the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court
rules as follows:

BACKGROUND
Carmen R. Finan initiated this action on September 14, 2007, alleging claims against
Defendant for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure.1 Ms. Finan and Defendant are
siblings, and Ms. Finan's claims arisefroma trust deed recorded on May 15,1991, and trust
deed note regarding certain real property that Defendant inherited following the deaths of
their parents, Frank and Leona Adams. (See Trust Deed; see also Trust Deed Note). The trust
deed note called for Defendant to pay Ms. Finan certain sums contingent upon the sale, assignment or transfer of the subject property. (See Trust Deed Note,ffifA,D & E). On January 22, 1999, Defendant recorded a quit claim deed that transferred tide to the subject propCarmen R. Finan, died on September 16, 2009. The successors and representatives of Ms. Finan's estate and the
trustees of Ms. Finan's revocable trust, Christine Helfrich and Mary Anne Chesarek, were later substituted as party
plaintiffs on March 30,2010, and filed an amended complaint reflecting the substitution on May 3,2010.
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Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
Case No. 070700508
erty to himself and his wife as joint tenants. {See Quit Claim Deed). Subsequently, on January 4, 2005, Defendant and his wife recorded a special warranty deed that transferred title to
the subject property into two (2) trusts for which Defendant and his wife are trustees. (See
Special Warranty Deed), Ms. Finan and Plaintiffs alleged that these transfers triggered Defendant's payment obligations under the trust deed note and that Defendant's failure to tender payment constitutes a breach of contract. Defendant filed his answer to Ms. Finan's
complaint on December 17, 2007, in which he denied liability.2
On July 30, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. In their accompanying supporting memorandum, Plaintiffs assert that it is undisputed Defendant transferred
title to the subject property and that Defendants payment under the trust deed note is due
and owing. Plaintiffs also argue that they are emitted to recover attorneys1 fees under the
trust deed note, (see Trust Deed Note, fF), and pursuant to Utah's reciprocal attorneys* fees
statute. 5^Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-826>

;

'.

'

-

In response to Plaintiffs' motion, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on August 16, 2010. In his accompanying supporting memorandum, Defendant argues that the 1999 and 2005 transfers of tide do not constitute a sale, assignment or transfer
for purposes of the triggering the trust deed note's payment obligations, as he remained the
subject property's titiehoider. Alternatively, Defendant argues that because Ms. Finan was
on constructive record notice of the 1999 transfer, Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed as
untimely under the six-year statute of limitations for obligations founded upon written contracts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2). Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to foreclose the subject property, as they are neither the trustee nor beneficiary of the
trust deed, and requests an award of attorneys, fees under the trust deed note, (see Trust
Deed Note, $F), and pursuant to Utah's reciprocal attorneys' fees statute, See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-5-826. Additionally, Defendant filed a motion to strike the declarations Plaintiffs submitted in support of their motion for summary, judgment arguing that the declara2

Defendant filed his answer to Plaintiffs* amended complaint on May 18,2010.
- 2 ~

•••
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Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
Case No. 070700508
tions are not based on personal knowledge, lack foundation, and contain hearsay and conelusory statements.
Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that
their claims are not barred by the six-year statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2309(2) because Defendant did not provide notice of either transfer of title and Ms. Finan did
not have actual notice of the 1999 transfer until sometime after 2001. Alternatively, Plaintiffs request the Court equitably toll the statute of limitations asserting that Defendant had
concealed or mislead Ms. Finan and Plaintiffs regarding the transfers of title and claiming
exceptional circumstances based upon the parties' familial relationship and Plaintiffs* being
unsophisticated in matters concerning real property. Plaintiffs also requested a continuance
pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to conduct additional discovery.
&*UtahR.Civ.P.56(f).
On December 13, 2010, the Court held a hearing on the motions and the parties
reasserted their prior arguments. At the close of the hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs' request for Rule 56(f) continuance based upon Plaintiffs' failure to submit a supporting affidavit in compliance with the rule, see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), see also Aspenwood v, CAT,, LLC,
2003 UT App. 28,ffl[18-23,73 P-3d 947, and took the remaining issues under advisement.
Accordingly, the Court finds that briefing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment is complete and that the matters are now ripe for determination.3
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material
3

After review and consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court finds that Defendant's motion to strike is rendered moot by its ruling on the parties' cross-motions. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Defendant's motion to strike.

-3-
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Case No. 070700508
issues of fact exist[,]" so as to determine if judgment may be rendered as a matter of law.
Draper City v. Estate ofBernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
Here, the Court finds that there is no dispute as to any material issue of fact relevant
to the Court's determination. In particular, it is undisputed that a trust deed, recorded May
15, 1991, and trust deed note placed certain payment obligations on Defendant upon the
sale, assignment or transfer of the subject property, (See Trust Deed; see also Trust Deed
Note, flA, D & E). Defendant transferred tide to the subject property on January 22, 1999,
as reflected by a recorded quit claim deed, (see Quite Claim Deed), and again on January 4,
2005, as reflected by a recorded special warranty deed. (See Special Warranty Deed). Defendant failed to make payment pursuant to the trust deed note upon demand, and Plaintiff
Carmen R. Finan filed this action on September 14, 2007, approximately eight (8) years and
eight (8) months after the subject property's 1999 transfer of title. (See Complaint). Accordingly, the Court's determination on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment turns
on its interpretation of the plain language of the trust deed note and applicable statutory and
appellate case law.
The trust deed note states: "In the event the title to the real property ... securing this
note is sold, assigned or transferred for any reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining balance of this note is immediately due and payable." (Trust Deed Note, TJA). The Court
finds that this language is clear and unambiguously obligated Defendant to make immediate
payment to Ms. Finan upon the transfer of the subject property for any reason or in any
manner. On January 22, 1999, Defendant transferred title to the subject property from his
sole ownership to a joint tenancy between Defendant and his wife. (See Quit Claim Deed).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the 1999 transfer triggered Defendant's payment obligation under the trust deed note. (See Trust Deed Note, ^ A , D & E).
The statute of limitations for actions "upon any contract, obligation, or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing/' such as Plaintiffs' causes of action in this case, is
six (6) years. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2). "In most cases a cause of action accrues and
~4r-
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the statutes of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action." Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, 1(12, 78
P.3d 616 (Internal quotations omitted). "However, the discovery rule is an exception to
th[e] general rule [that a limitations period will begin to run when a cause of action accrues].
... [Tjhe discovery rule tolls the limitations period until facts forming tUe basis for the cause
of action are discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered." Rappleye v. Rappleye, 2004 UT App 290,1)19, 99 P.3d 348 (Internal quotations omitted).
In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued when Defendant
failed to make immediate payment to Ms. Finan following the subject property's January
22,1999 transfer of title. (See Trust Deed Note,fflJA,D & E; see also Quit Claim Deed). Further, the Court finds that Ms. Finan was on constructive notice of the subject property's
transfer and the accrual of her causes of action by virtue of the recording of Defendant's quit
claim deed.4 See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) ("Each document executed, acknowledged,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by [Tide 57],.. shall, from the time of recording with
the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents."). Ms. Finan
did not file her complaint until September 14, 2007, approximately eight (8) years and eight
(8) months later. (See Complaint). Accordingly, the Court finds as a matter of law that absent equitable tolling of the applicable six-year statute of limitations, see Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2-309(2), Plaintiffs' causes of action are barred as they were filed untimely.
"For the equitable discovery rule to apply, one of two situations must exist: (1) a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct or (2) the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the

Neither the trust deed nor the trust deed note required Defendant to give Ms. Finan actual notice of the subject
property's transfer. (See Trust Deed; see also Trust Deed Note). "Moreover, mere ignorance of the existence of a
cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Carson, 2003 UT App 316, %\2 (Internal
quotations omitted).
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Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
Case No. 070700508
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action/* Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT
87, f53, 223 P.3d 1128 (Internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, "before a statute of limitations may be tolled under either situation, the plaintiff must make an initial showing that
[s]he did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably comply with the limitations period/* Id. "This knowledge may be
actual or constructive[, and the] determination of the initial showing is a question of fact.**
Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Defendant did not conceal the 1999 transfer of title based
on his recording of the quit claim deed on January 22, 1999, which placed Ms. Finan on
constructive notice of the transfer and accrual of her causes of action. (See Quit Claim Deed;
see also Trust Deed Note,fflJA,D & E). Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not
submitted any competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant's conduct was misleading. Additionally, the Court finds that this case does not
present exceptional circumstances that would justify an equitable tolling of the applicable
statute of limitations. See Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237,162, 239 P.3d 308 ("The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances is a question of
law and turns on a balancing test, that examines the hardship the statute of limitations
would impose on the plaintiff as compared with any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time.**) (Internal citations and quotations omitted).
Specifically, the Court finds that the six-year statute of limitations applicable to this case, see
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2), provided Ms. Finan ample time to evaluate and assert her
claims. Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Ms. Finan had actual knowledge of the 1999
transfer of tide sometime after 2001 giving her approximately four (4) years to timely file her
complaint. Moreover, the Court finds that the passage of time and Plaintiffs* aged causes of
action will create difficulties and prejudice to Defendant, as title to the subject property
transferred a second time after the 1999 transfer and Ms. Finan cannot be called to testify as
a witness. Thus, the Court finds as a matter of law that the equitable discovery rule will not
-6-
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act to toll the statute of limitations to permit Plaintiffs' causes of action to persist. The Court
must, therefore, find as a matter of law that Plaintiffs' causes of action are barred as untimely under the six-year statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2). Accordingly,
the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendant's
cross-motion for summary judgment.5

5

Regarding Defendant's request for attorneys' fees, Utah appellate courts have generally held that, "attorney fees
are awarded only when authorized by contract or by statute/* Bilamich v, Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, fll 1, 160 P.3d 1041.
Here, the trust deed note provides: "If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal
or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned agrees to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
reasonable attorney's fees." (See Trust Deed Note, flF). The Court finds that under the trust deed note's plain language Defendant would not be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for his defense of Plaintiffs' claims. However,
Utah's reciprocal attorneys' fees statute states: "A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. Nevertheless, "the language of [Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826]
is not mandatory but allows courts to exercise discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs." Lonetti, 2007 UT 27,
1[17. In making a determination on whether to award attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826, "district
courts should award fees liberally under [the statute] where pursuing or defending an action results in an unequal
exposure to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees." Id, at ^[19. However, the Utah Supreme Court has
stressed "that in furthering the policies behind [Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826],... courts may also inform their decisions with other equitable principles. For example, in the spirit of leveling the playing field, courts should avoid
using this statute to expose one party to a disproportionate risk of paying attorney fees that would result in a windfall
to the other party." Id. at ^[20. Here, while Utah's reciprocal attorneys' fees statute is potentially applicable to Defendant's request for attorneys' fees as the plain language of the trust deed note would have entitled Plaintiffs to an
award of attorneys' fees if successful on their claims, the Court finds that equity does not favor an award of attorneys' fees to Defendant. In particular, the Court finds that an award of attorneys' fees to Defendant in this case
would result in a windfall. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's request for attorneys' fees and costs.

A AA~~

J.

iQCs

Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
Case No. 070700508
CONCLUSION
Based on theforegoing,the Court:
(1)

DENIES Plaintiffs'motion for summary judgment;

(2)

GRANTS Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment;

(3)

DENIES Defendant's request for attorneys' fees and costs; and

(4)

DENIES Defendant's motion to strike.

The Court directs Defendant to prepare and submit an Order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling.
Date signed: February 4, 201L

STRICT COURT J U l M ^ 0 V . >A f f> i
JOHN R. MORRIS
y£\
*«** p i
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

L

l ^ day of ffJbnA£)g>M . 2011,1 sent a true and cor-

rect copy of the foregoing Ruling to the parties as follows:
David B. Stevenson
Brad C.Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
.

T. Richard Davis
Thomas B. Price
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Zions Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

^Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINE B. HELFRICH, and MARY
ANNE CHESAREK, Successors and
Representatives of Carmen R. Finan Estate, and
TRUSTEES to the CARMEN R. ADAMS
FINAN REVOCABLE TRUST,

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER
Case No. 070700508
Judge John R. Morris

Plaintiffs,
vs.
LUKE L. ADAMS, an individual,
Defendant.

On or about December 13, 2010, this Court presided over the scheduled hearing for a
number of motions fded by the parties, in the above-captioned action. Plaintiffs were
represented by David B. Stevenson of the law firm of Stevenson & Smith, P.C. Defendant Luke
L. Adams ("Adams") was represented by Thomas B. Price of the law firm Callister Nebeker &
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McCullough. At the hearing the Court considered pleadings filed and argument presented on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance;
Adams' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; and Adams' Motion to Strike Declarations. The
Court denied Plaintiffs* Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance from the bench at the conclusion of
the hearing and stated that the Court would take the remainder of the motions under advisement
and render a written ruling.
On or about February 4,2011, the Court issued its Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike (the "Ruling"). The Court, in its Ruling, denied Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgement; granted Adams' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, denied
Adams* request for attorneys' fees and costs; and denied Adams' Motion to Strike. The Court
further directed Adams to prepare and submit an Order that is consistent with and reflects the
Ruling.
Pursuant to the Ruling signed and entered by this Court, dated February 4, 2011, and
based upon UTAH R. CIV. P. 52, this Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

Carmen R. Finan initiated the above-captioned matter on September 14, 2007,

alleging claims against Adams for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure.1

barmen R. Finan, died on September 16, 2009. The successors and representatives of.
Ms. Finan's estate and the trustees of Ms. Finan's revocable trust, Christine Helfrich and Mary
Anne Chesarek, were later substituted as party plaintiffs on March 30, 2010 and filed an
amended complaint reflecting the substitution on May 3, 2010.
2
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2.

Ms, Finan and Adams are siblings.

3.

Ms. Finan's claims arose from a trust deed recorded on May 15,1991, ("Trust

Deed") and trust deed note, dated May 13,1991, (the "Note") regarding certain real property that
Adams inherited following the deaths of Finan and Adams' parents, Frank and Leona Adams.
4.

The certain real property is described as follows:

Parcel #1: BEG 366.5 FT W & 33 FT S FR TH NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC 29.
T4N-RLW; SLM: TH W 30 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 90 FT, TH N 200 FT, TH
W 94.4 FT. TH S 200 FT, TH W 97.45 FT. TH S 1087 FT, TH E 311.95 FT, TH
N 1287 FT TO BEG. CON. 8.414 ACRES
Parcel #2: BEG AT APT ON S BNDY LN OF LAYTON TOWN; W 366.5 FT &
S 1320 FT FR NE COR OF NW1/4 OF SEC 29; T4N-R1W; SLM: TH W 311.95
FT; TH S 836 FT TO E'LY R/W LN OF DRG RY; TH S 33° 18' E 545 FT MOL
TO PT DUE S OF BEG; TH N 1275 FT TO BEG. CON 8.95 ACRES
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 are contiguous and are collectively referred to herein as the "Property*"
5.

On May 13, 1991, Adams executed the Note in favor of Finan for the principal

amount of $13,170.00 at 0% interest per annum and no due date.
6.

The Note is secured by that certain Trust Deed of even date, duly recorded in the

Official Records of the Davis County Recorder, State of Utah, on May 15, 1991 as Entry No.
927132 at Book 1412 beginning at Page 474.
7.

The subject Trust Deed, recorded May 15, 1991 and the Trust Deed Note placed

certain payment obligations on Adams upon the sale, assignment or transfer of the subject
property,

3
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8.

Paragraph A of the Note states that, "In the event the title to the [Property]...

securing this note is sold, assigned or transferred for any reason or in any manner, then the entire
remaining balance of this note is immediately due and payable." See Note,flA.
9.

Paragraph D of the Note states that the Note is "due and payable upon sale,

assignment or transfer" of the Property; See Note, ^ D.
10.

Paragraph E of the Note states that "any sale, transfer, assignment, bankruptcy or

disposition of the Property securing this Note within twelve months after this Note has been paid
off wherein the maker [Adams] receives consideration therefore in excess of $129,942.00 will
entitle payee to the incremental additional amount of 20.27% [or 10.135% to Finan] of such
consideration less [the amount previously paid]." See Note, f R
11.

On January 22, 1999, Adams transferred the Property to himself and his wife, as

joint tenants pursuant to a quit claim deed (the "1999 Transfer").
12.

Adams caused the deed for the 1999 Transfer to be recorded with the Davis

County Recorder. The deed was stamped Recorded on January 22, 1999, Book 2434, Page 876.
13.
14.
15.

Adams did not conceal the January 22, 1999 Transfer of title of the Property^
A

Ms. Finan had actual knowledge of the 1999 Transfer of title sometime after 2001.
The passage of time and Plaintiffs' aged causes of action created difficulties and

prejudice to Adams, as title to the Property transferred a second time after the 1999 transfer and
Ms. Finan cannot be called to testify as a witness.
*<"*^J
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16.

Paragraph F of the Note provides, "If this note is collected by an attorney after

default in the payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned agrees
to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fees." See Note, fF.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and having reviewed the points and
authorities recited by the parties, and others germane to this matter, the Court hereby makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), failing to submit a required,

supporting affidavit. Id; Asnenwood v.CA.T. LLC 2003 UT App. 28 fl 18-23,73 P.3d 947.
2.

The Trust Deed, recorded May 15,1991 and the Trust Deed Note, dated May 13,

1991, placed certain payment obligations on Adams upon the sale, assignment or transfer of the
Property,
3.

Paragraph A of the Note is clear and unambiguously obligated Adams to make

immediate payment to Ms. Finan upon the transfer of the Property of any reason or in any
manner,
4.

On January 22, 1999, Adams transferred title to the Property from his sole

ownership to a joint tenancy between Adams and his wife. Adamsalso transferred title to the
Property on January 4, 2005t4> M&* < ^ ^ t ^

d$ hwt&5 *fffrg

M^L^^T^^iM

5.

The 1999 Transfer triggered Defendant's payment obligations under the Note.

6.

Adams failed to make payment to Ms. Finan pursuant to the Note.
5
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7.

Adams did not conceal the 1999 Transfer of title of the Property.

8.

Plaintiff filed this action on September 14,2007, approximately eight (8) years

and eight (8) months after the Property's 1999 Transfer of title to the Property.
9.

The statute of limitations for actions "upon any contract, obligation, or liability

founded upon an instrument in writing," such as Plaintiffs5 causes of action in this case, is six (6)
years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B~2-309(2).
10.

Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued when Adams failed to make immediate

payment to Ms. Finan following the Property's 1999 Transfer of title.
11.

Ms. Finan was on constructive notice of the Property's 1999 Transfer and the

accrual of her causes of action by virtue of the recording of Adams' quit claim deed with the
Davis County Recorder's Office.
12.

Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified in the manner prescribed by

[Title 57] shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to
all persons of their contents. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102 (emphasis added).
13.

This court concludes that this case does not present exceptional circumstances that

would justify an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, accordingly Utah's Equitable
Discovery Rale tolling the applicable statute of limitations does not apply to this matter.
14.

The six-year statute of limitations is applicable to this matter. UTAH CODE ANN. §

78B-2-309(2).

6
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15.

Plaintiffs* causes of action contained in their Amended Complaint and any and all

claims based upon the Note and Trust Deed are barred as untimely, including but not limited to
the $13,170.00 original principal balance, pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations of UTAH
CODE ANN.

16.

§ 786-2-309(2).
Any and all claims, rights, terms, conditions, indebtedness and obligations set

forth by the Note and Trust Deed are cancelled, discharged and declared .to be unenforceable.
17.

The Note provides for attorneys' fees, "If this note is collected by an attorney after

default in the payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned agrees
to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorneys' fees. Note, % F.
18.

Utah law provides for the reciprocity of the application of an attorneys' fees

awards. "A court may award costs and attorneys fees to either party that prevails in a civil action
based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,1986,
when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one '
party to recover attorneys fees."
19.

UTAH CODE ANN.

The language of UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78B-5-826.

§ 78B-5-826 is not mandatory but allows

courts to exercise discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. See Bilanzich v. Lonettl 2007
UT 26,117,160 P.3d 1041.
20.

The award of attorneys' fees to Adams in this case would result in a windfall.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
.7
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MS

ORDER
1.

That Plaintiffs* Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance is denied;

2.

That Plaintiffs* Motion for Summary Judgment is denied;

3.

That Adams' Motion to Strike is denied;

4.

That Adams' Motion for Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;

5.

Plaintiffs shall release the Trust Deed and any other incumbrance on the Property,

of which they caused to be placed, immediately; and
6.

That Adams' request for attorneys' fees and costs is denied,

DATED this

day of February, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

Iiouefable JolinR. Morris ^ ^ M ^
Second District
)istrict <
Court J ^ p j R & V

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

David B. Stevenson, Esq.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINE B. HELFRICH, and MARY
ANNE CHESAREK, Successors and
Representatives of Carmen R. Finan Estate, and
TRUSTEES to the CARMEN R. ADAMS
FINAN REVOCABLE TRUST,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Case No. 070700508
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Judge John R. Morris

LUKE L. ADAMS, an individual,
Defendant

•

Final Judgment is hereby entered in this action as set forth below, which had been
determined pursuant to this Court's granting of Defendant Luke L. Adams' ("Adams") CrossMotion for Summary Judgement and based upon this Court's February 3, 2011 Ruling and the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order filed concurrently, herewith. Accordingly,
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it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance

are denied
2.

Adams* Motion to Strike Declarations is denied. Adams* Motion for Summary

Judgement is granted. Adams* request for attorney's fees is denied.
3.

Plaintiffs' causes of action contained in their Amended Complaint and any and all

claims based upon the Note and Trust Deed are barred as untimely, including but not limited to
the $13,170.00 original principal balance, pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations of UTAH
CODE ANN.

4.

§ 78B-2~309(2).
Any and all claims, rights, terms, conditions, indebtedness and obligations set

forth by the Note and Trust Deed are cancelled, discharged and declared to be unenforceable*
5.

Plaintiffs shall release the Trust Deed and any other incumbrance on the Property,

of which they caused to be placed, immediately.
6.

The above-captioned matter is disposed as to all the parties and finally disposes of

the subject matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.
7.

It is further Ordered that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), this Judgment is

deemed to be the final judgment and the entry thereof is hereby expressly directed,
DATED this

day of February, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

^y^aZ4)iM^^

HoHCrable John R. Morris , ^,
Second District Court Judgd^l

'<A
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

David B. Stevenson, Esq.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COIBOTND
1 DISTRICT COURT
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF U T £ H ~ ^
— ~
CHRISTINE B, HELFRICH and MARY
ANNE CHESAREK, Successors and Representatives of THE CARMEN R. FINAN
ESTATE and Trustees of THE CARMEN
R. ADAMS FINAN TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

RULING AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 60 MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER
Civil No. 070700508
Judge John R. Morris

vs.
LUKE L. ADAMS,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order.
The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting
documentation, and the Court's case file. Having considered all of the arguments, determined that a hearing is unnecessary for its ruling and order, being fully advised in the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion.

BACKGROUND
On December 13, 2010, the Court held a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment and other pending motions.1 The Court then entered a ruling denying
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment on February 4, 2011,findingthat the six-year statute of limitations for causes of action based upon a written contract barred Plaintiffs' claims. The Court also found
that the equitable discovery rule did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims, as Plaintiffs failed to
submit sufficient competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant's conduct was misleading, and as the'case did not present exceptional circum-

At the close of the hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 56(f) continuance due to Plaintiffs
failure to submit a supporting affidavit in compliance with the Rule. The Court also took the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment under advisement.
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stances. Accordingly, the Court enteredfindingsof fact and conclusions of law and a final
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims on April 7, 2011.
Subsequently, on June 24, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order urging the Court to find that the statute of limitations for their claims should be equitably tolled, as newly discovered evidence suggests that Defendant concealed and misrepresented information relating to the accrual of their claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that
on November 21, 2006, Defendant filed a petition in the probate case for the estate of
Frankie Emley, Second Disk Ct. Case No. 063700360, which sought court approval for the
payment of his obligation under the promissory note that is the subject matter of this litigation. Plaintiffs maintained that Defendant's 2006 petition affirmatively represented that the
promissory note was not currendy due and payable because the underlying property had not
been sold or transferred. Plaintiffs submitted that in light of this newly discovered evidence
of Defendant's concealment of the property's transfer, Defendant's fraud upon the Court,
and in the interest of justice, the Court should set aside its final judgment pursuant to Rule
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and reinstate Plaintiffs' claims under the equitable
discovery rule.
Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 60 motion on July
11, 2011. In his opposition, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements
of Rule 60(b) to obtain relief from the Court's final judgment. In particulate Defendant argued that Plaintiffs failed to establish that his 2006 petition could not have been discovered
with due diligence and produced in time to oppose Defendant's cross-motion for summary
judgment or to move the Court for a new trial.2 Defendant further argued that the allegations within his 2006 petition are consistent with his argument in this litigation that Plaintiffs' claims are premature. Defendant also maintained that his 2006 petition does not affect
the Court's construction of the promissory note at issue, or when Plaintiffs' predecessor-in2

Defendant noted that Plaintiffs* counsel's law firm represented Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest in the probate proceedings for the estate of Frankie Emley.
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interest had constructive and actual knowledge of the existence of her claims. Accordingly,
Defendant submitted that Plaintiffs' motion must be denied.
Plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of their Rule 60 motion on August 1,
2011. In their reply, Plaintiffs acknowledged that their counsel's law firm represented their
predecessor-in-interest in the Frankie Emley estate proceedings, but argued that because the
law firm's involvement in the matter was limited, prior knowledge of Defendant's 2006 petition should not be imputed to PlaintiflFs. Plaintiffs also maintained that regardless of whether
they should have been aware of Defendant's 2006 petition at some earlier point in time, Defendant's misrepresentations and misconduct warrant relief under Rule 60(b).
On November 3, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding their
Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order. While a hearing on the motion has been requested,
the Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary and will not aid the Court in its determination.
Accordingly, briefing on Plaintiffs' motion is complete and the matter is now ripe for determination.
ANALYSIS
"Rule 60(b) is an equitable rule designed to balance the competing interests of finality and fairness." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,1J63, 150 P<3d 480. "Because of the equitable nature of the rule, a district court has broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) motion." Id.
Here, Plaintiffs seek to set aside the Court's order of final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b),
which reads in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Court finds that Plaintiffs' arguments pertaining to Rule 60(b)
lack merit.
-3-
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First, while Plaintiffs maintain that they only recently discovered Defendant's 2006
petition, Plaintiffs fail to submit any sufficient explanation as to why this evidence could not
have been discovered by due diligence at an earlier point in these proceedings or in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Defendant's
2006 petition is part of the Court's docket in the probate proceedings for the estate of
Frankie Emley and is, therefore, public record. Moreover, Plaintiffs' counsel's lawfirmrepresented Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest in the estate proceeding. Given these facts, the
Court cannot find that Defendant's 2006 petition could not have been discovered by due diligence or that it is "newly discovered evidence" for purposes of Rule 60(b)(2),4
The Court next finds that Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(3) argument concerning Defendant's
fraud upon the court and misrepresentations is misplaced. While Defendant's 2006 petition
alleged that the underlying promissory note was not due and payable because no portion of
the property had been sold or transferred, Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest denied this allegation, indicating a lack of reliance on the representation, and the probate court never ruled
on the issue. Moreover, Defendant has not changed his position from that in the probate
proceeding, but rather alternatively argued that the applicable statute of limitations barred
Plaintiffs' claims. In construing the underlying promissory note and considering the undisputed material facts on summary judgment, the Court found that the promissory note became due and payable in January 1999 and that Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest untimely
filed her complaint in September 2007. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find
any fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct on the part of Defendant for purposes of
granting Plaintiffs relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
With regard to Plaintiffs' interests of justice argument, the Court emphasizes that
"relief under rule 60(b)(6) is meant to be the exception rather than the rule; [courts] have
3

Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "[a] motion for a new trial shall be served not
later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(b).
4

Whether or not Plaintiffs* predecessor-in-interest's knowledge of Defendant's 2006 petition is imputed to
Plaintiffs does not affect the Court's determination on the applicability of Rule 60(b)(2) to this matter.
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previously held that it should be 'sparingly invoked' and used 'only in unusual and exceptional circumstances/" Menzies, 2006 UT 81, %1\ (quoting Laub v. S. Cent Utah Tel Ass'n.,
657 P.2d 1304, 1307-08 (Utah 1982)). Given the procedural background, undisputed material facts and evidence presented in this matter, as discussed above, the Courtfindsno unusual or exceptional circumstances that warrant the relief Plaintiffs seek under Rule 60(b)(6).
Finally, even if the Court were to construe the representations within Defendant's
2006 petition as an attempt to conceal the property's transfer from Plaintiffs' predecessor-ininterest, this single act, which occurred after the applicable statute of limitations had run,
does not alter the Court's findings and conclusions on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, nor would it justify reinstatement of Plaintiffs' claims under the equitable
discovery rule. See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, TJ23, 223 P.3d 1128 (holding that a plaintiff must make an initial showing that it did not know nor should have reasonably known
the facts underlying its causes of action in time to reasonably comply with a limitations period before the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled); see also Ottens v. McNeil 2010
UT App 237, lj|62, 239 P.3d 308 (holding that exceptional circumstances for purposes of equitably tolling a statute of limitations turns on a balancing test that examines the hardship
imposed on the plaintiff and any prejudice to the defendant). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion for RelieffromOrder.5
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1)

5

Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order is DENIED; and

With his opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order, Defendant requested an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the terms of the promissory note and Utah's reciprocal attorneys' fees statute. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-5-826. However, the Court finds that equity does not favor an award of attorneys' fees to Defendant in
this case, as such an award would result in a windfall. See Bilamich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, fflfl7-20, 160 P.3d
1041. The Court, therefore, DENIES Defendant's request for attorneys' fees.

Ruling and Order on Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order
Case No. 070700508
(2)

Defendant's request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.
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